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Abstract
The paper ascribes to the literature analysing the conditions leading
to the break-up of nations. The model englobes the existing literature
and considers two separate spaces, a state and its region, where informed
and non-informed citizens cohabit. We depart in considering that non-
informed citizens may be convinced, via the action of groups acting to
obtain independence. Conditions for separation are established and dis-
cussed.
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1 Introduction
In 1950, only 60 countries were members of the United Nations. Since then,
however, their number grew steadily : to 99 in 1960, 127 in 1970, 154 in 1980,
159 in 1990. Finally, the UN members are 189 in 2000. Quite curiously, though,
while the number of nations grew, the question of the optimal size and number
of nations came very recently on economists’ research agenda. Starting in the
1990s, the literature on the ”break-up of nations” has spread rapidly and several
interesting results have already emerged. To address the issue at stake, two
traditions have been followed : the public …nance and the …scal federalism
ones.1
Whatever the results obtained, the literature can still be considered being
in its early age (cf. Drazen, 2000, chap. 14). The present paper aims at helping
it to grow older, widening its scope by opening it to more in‡uences. More
precisely, we started from the observation that some nations’break-up are driven
by the action of separatist groups or parties, acting in diverse ways to obtain
independence. In the Corsican or Basque cases, for example, some terrorist
actions are undertaken in parallel with traditional (legal) political means. The
actions of these movements, to our view, is not really incorporated in the existing
¤Université du Littoral Côte d’Opale, Centre Universitaire Saint Louis, Département
Economie - Gestion, 62327 Boulogne-sur-Mer Cedex, France ; E-mail address : farvaque@univ-
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1See Bolton, Roland and Spolaore (1996).
1literature. Moreover, the literature generally assumes decisions about / against
integration to be taken through majority voting, whereas sometimes majority
voting is not enough to defeat independence partisans.2 That is, where Bolton
et al. (1996, p.699) state that ”a merger of two nations is a treaty which can
only be self-enforcing”, we would add that, sometimes, minority shareholders
hold the key to the enforcement process.
Our aim is thus to integrate that activist feature inside the burgeoning liter-
ature on the break-up of nations. We thus adopt a theoretical framework that
owes more to Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Bardhan and Mookherjee
(2000) than to the in‡uential ones of Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Bolton
and Roland (1997)3. This allows us to consider interest groups acting for in-
dependence, and to avoid the a priori hypothesis of a cost induced by the sep-
aration. We thus add another political dimension to the problem, considering
explicitly pro-independence (armed or peaceful) actions. All these actions are,
in our context, legally …nanced, but the funds are coming from ”volontary” con-
tributions made by those citizens who are sympathetic with the separatist view.
Separatism is thus legally promoted, whatever the actual government may think
of it.
This article is thus an exploration in the economics of separatism, relevant
for territories belonging to a single political space, but not necessarily to a
continuous geographical one. The ”liberation …ght” we study takes place in a
democracy, with room for independantists to express their claims. We try to
disentangle how the welfare of the two territorial entities evolve if the region
secedes. Section 2 shows the model structure ; next, actions under the two situ-
ations we consider (break-up and status quo) are detailed. Section 4 establishes
the breaking-up condition, while section 5 discusses some extensions.
2 The model
2.1 Regionalists and legitimists
The model inspires from those by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) and Gross-
man and Helpman (1994).
We consider 2 separate spaces : the mainland, noted by m, and the (smaller
and mainland-dependent) region, r. The region can be a colony, an overseas
territory, or an island. Respectively, those spaces contain citizens in relative
proportions nm and nr, with nm + nr = 1.
Over each space, citizens can be divided into two groups : legitimists, l, and
the regionalists, aiming at the independence for the region, and which will be
indexed by r. Both spaces do not contain the same proportions of both citizens
types : in each space i, one …nds a proportion ¯i;l of legitimists and ¯i;r of
2For example, in Spain, the Constitution has been adopted by a majority in the 1975
referendum, without helping to contain the Basque separatism. The same case could be made
about Corsica, the majority of its residents favouring the French regime, not the ”opting-out”
option.
3See also Firdmuc (1999), who considers the same issues in a stochastic framework.
2regionalists. One has logically : ¯i;r = 1 ¡ ¯i;l. In each group of citizens, we
distinguish informed inhabitants, who feel concerned about the issue at stake.
These informed citizens are in relative proportions ®l et ®r, and they act on
the basis of their expected welfare under the announced policy.4 One could also
assume that ¯r < ¯l and ®r > ®l : i.e. regionalists are less numerous than
legitimists but they are more informed / politically motivated.5
Citizens’ welfare will depend on the policy implemented, which will be pend-
ing on who holds the power in each space. Each citizen j of the group g has a
welfare de…ned by the utility function of the type Ug(j)
¡
xk¢
, where xk is the pol-
icy implemented par the k-type politician. We consider two kinds of politicians
: M is the mainland government, re‡ecting the legitimists aspirations, whom
is confronted with the regionalist party, pleading for devolution (the maximum
devolution being independence, of course), D. One can think of this party as the
legal facade of pro-independence activists as, for example, Corsica Nazione and
the FLNC in France. As long as independence is not achieved, the government
wants (and is supposed able) to implement its policy on the whole territory.
The regionalists, by contrast, are motivated only by the region’s residents wel-
fare (and, among them, by their partisans).
2.2 Taxes and contributions
In the case of independence, each party will implement its preferred policy
on its playground (hence, respectively, the devolutionists in the region r, the
mainland government over m), each policy being …nanced by taxes collected on
each respective space.
However, as long as there is no break-up, the mainland government imple-
ments its preferred policy on both spaces, with taxes collected on the whole
territory. In that case, devolutionists have to plead their cause, trying to con-
vince uninformed citizens. Conviction will be obtained through actions …nanced
by ”volontary contributions” collected on citizens having a sympathy for the re-
gionalists’ cause. The way we model englobes the really volontary contributions
given, for example, by the diaspora in favor of the …ght (be it an armed one :
terrorism, guerilla-type actions, or a paci…c one : demonstrations, sit-ins, ...).
But it also deals with racket (extortions, ”impôt révolutionnaire”, ...). These
contributions-…nanced actions have an impact on non-informed citizens, which
they may convince to support the independence cause.
Collecting those contributions is the task of a fraction of regionalist-informed
citizens. Note that they can collect these over the whole territory, being in
relative proportions lr;m and lr;r.6 We simply assume that we have : ®r;i > lr;i
with i = m;r : i.e., partisans most engaged in the …ght for independence are less
4To simplify, we do not consider here time consistency problems, and consider the an-
nounced policy to be implemented.
5That hypothesis sounds realistic, and is standard since at least Olson’s (1966) analyses,
but it does not in‡uence qualitatively the results.
6Using the term contributions makes the link with the literature on interest groups explicit.
Other things equal, the activist fraction resembles members of a lobby, as in the works of
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000), in the line of Grossman and Helpman (1994, for example).
3numerous than the whole of the partisans, whatever the part of the territory we
consider (the state or the region).
3 Welfare under breaking-up or staying-in
Each kind of governing body (the mainland government or the regionalist party)
has to maximise his utility function, conditional to the region being independent
or not, as its tax-collection capabilities will vary in due case. Each ”party” seeks
to implement its preferred policy. To do so, it has to maximise its informed
supporters, and has to convince non-informed citizens.
3.1 The Devolutionist Party
When the region is independent (i.e. it is ”out”, O), the program for the party
defending that position will concern only the region’s inhabitants. The objective










That is, the Devolutionist party will try, when the region is independent, to












Welfare of the legitimists informed citizens (a proportion ®l;r¯l;r of the region’s
population) can be discounted by ±
D < 1, if the Devolutionist party has a
marked preference for its supporters relatively to the rest of the region’s inhab-
itants.7
In case of independence, non-informed citizens welfare has also to be con-








¿Dnr = h°r¿Dnr (3)
The …rst term of the right-hand side, h, signals the conviction e¢ciency of
(tax-…nanced) expenditures made to convince the region’s non-informed (i.e. :
°r).
Hence, taxes collected by the Devolutionist party in its region when indepen-
dence has been achieved have ambiguous e¤ects : on the one hand, they reduce
welfare of the whole region’s residents (including independence supporters) but,
on the other hand, they increase non-informed citizens adhesion.
In the other case (the status quo), the Devolutionist party will have a di¤er-
ent program : its objective will be reduced to convincing non-informed citizens.
7Weird as it may sound, that assumption is not so far from some reality. Corsica Nazione,
for example, distinguish between the Corsicans and the ”allogenic” people.
4We can thus write :
V D=NO ¡
xD¢
= °rCr + °mCm (4)
This expression shows that, when thecountry isnot broken-up, independence
will progress through contributions collected by active supporters on the whole
territory. These supporters, lr, are in proportion lr¯r = lr;r¯r;r + lr;m¯r;m
of the whole independence-prone population. Contributions are collected both
in the region (Cr) and in the mainland (Cm)8. As seems logical, only the
most concerned citizens collect the contributions. These people accept the task
because they favour the (potential) political victory’s welfare. That victory
probability is for the moment considered exogenous and equal to q9. The total
amount of collected contributions will thus be equal to : Ci = lr;i¯r;iqUr;i
¡
xD¢
with i = m;r . These contributions are due to in‡uence non-informed citizens,
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¢
(5b)
3.2 The Mainland Government
For the government, the problem has the same structure, though he has (his-
torically) received the legal tax monopoly, and has thus not to rely on parellel
movements (lobbies, supporters networks, associations, or terrorist groups) to
convince his non-informed citizens. We will just suppose, to simplify, that the
region is small enough to be without any in‡uence on the tax rate the govern-
ment will choose in either the independence or the status quo cases.11










Hence, after the breaking-up, the government will consider only the mainland
(informed and non-informed) residents’ welfare. Nevertheless, their welfare will
be reduced by taxes collected on all the mainland’s residents. RHS elements of
that objective function can be detailed as :
8The latter can also be thought of as revenue ‡owing from the diaspora to …nance the
independence …ght.
9As in Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000).
10One can verify easily that, under our hypotheses, we have °m > °r : the region’s citizens
are globally more concerned than the mainland’s ones ; i.e. non-informed are relatively more
numerous in the mainland.
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He considers in that case welfare of the citizens residing on both spaces, with
taxes being collected on the whole collectivity. Symetrically with what precedes,





















as nothing can preclude the government to favor legitimists citizens compared
to independence supporters, the latter welfare may be discounted : ±
M < 1.12
4 Breaking-up condition
Absent any time-consistency problems, the choice between independence and
the status quo will be derived from the comparison of welfare levels obtained
under each situation for each space. Both situations have nevertheless a di¤erent
probability of emergence with, as we have seen, independence being assorted of
a …xed, exogenous, probability, q.
Proposition 1 : Breaking-up condition : For the region to secede, the following
inequality has to be met :
qV D=O ¸ (1 ¡q)V M=NO (12)
that is, the region’s welfare under independence has to be superior or equal to
the level obtained under the status quo.
12Once again, this may sound weird or even shocking, but is sometimes at the source
of independence claims, some citizens considering themselves (or being truly considered) as
”second class” ones.
6Proposition 2 : Costless separation condition : For the mainland government,
losing the region brings no pain if :
qV M=O ¸ (1¡ q)
h
V M=NO ¡ V D=NO
i
(13)
or, the welfare obtained by citizens when the governement rules only the gov-
ernment has to be superior or equal to the one met when he rules both spaces
(though, in the latter case, welfare has to be considered net of the political space
…lled by the Devolutionist party).
Of course, the latter point is due to the government’s considering separatist
parties actions as welfare-reducing by nature.13
Note that both conditions have not to be met simultaneously. In fact, the
…rst condition is the only su…cient one, as according independence to a region
which does not plead for seems odd, at least. The second condition is neither
su¢cient nor necesary ; it only derives the point at which the break-up bears no
cost to the state’s citizens.14 We are thus left with a single break-up condition.
4.1 A simple case
For the discussion, suppose that supporters (legitimists or regionalists) can not
be distinguished from the rest of the citizens. As a consequence, their welfare
can not be discounted and one will get : ±
D = ±
M = 1. Assume also that
the policy xk brings the same level of utility, whatever the option recipient


























the identity of the party implementing the policy is the only di¤erence. In that
case, stakes are reduced to a problem of political preference, i.e. citizens only
care about whom manages the …scal instrument …nancing the desired policy, or
about the bundle of public goods each kind of government may o¤er.
Above conditions (equations 12 and 13) can then be written as :














13An illustration of that point has recently been given by Spain, where relations between
the legal Basque parties and the government recently degraded, with the Basque Nationalist
Party (PNV) more and more considered as an ETA supporter (though its leaders protest
against violence, see The Economist, ”Terrorism in Spain”, november 11th, 2000).
14Of course, this is limited to elements included in the model. For example, geopolitical
considerations (e.g. rare resources or territorial waters), fundamental in some cases, are clearly
absent from it.
7These two expressions deliver the following results :15
Proposition 3 For the region as well as for the mainland, it clearly appears
that independence will improve welfare if, and only if, citizens’ utility variation
is superior to the taxation variation.
This result lies on a basic intuition, embedded in above equations : one has to
remark that adopted simpli…cations show-up (net of taxation) utility ratios. The
numerator shows (net) utility in the no-break-up case, whereas the independence
situation appears at the denominator. Hence, the higher independence-linked
(net) welfare (i.e. the higher U
¡
xD¢
and/or the lower ¿D), the easier the
inequality will be satis…ed, that is to say the easier it will be for the region to
access independence.
Proposition 4 For the mainland, the costless separation condition exhibits the
legal tax rate as well as the contributions. The more independence supporters
will be active, the less costly independence will be for the state residents.




, and the more numerous the activists, the harder it will be for the
government to maintain the status quo.16 Once again, the result lies on a
simple intuition : one has just to remark that the higher the pre-independence
contributions, the higher the post-independence utility variation for the state’s
residents. To o¤set an excessive activism, the government has only one degree
of freedom : to contain regionalists pressures, he can modify his own tax rate,
to o¤set the contributions weight. Of course, this has clear limits, and the
government may soon face the temptation to give away.
5 Concluding remarks
Our analysis shows that break-up conditions can be precised by considering
explicitly separatist movements’ actions. However,the model we exposed is
still crude and should be considered as a preliminary exploration of regionalists
movements in an economic framework.. As such, it points to several research
directions. The …rst one would enrich the range of the government’s possible
actions. One could expect a government to use repression against independen-
tist movements, at least when approaching a given threshold. This would bring
the model in line with some real situations (as France in New Caledonia, for
example, where repression is used jointly with peace-maintaining subsidies).
15Results are expressed for the simple case studied in this section, without being quali-
tatively a¤ected by adopted simpli…cations. Their expression in a more general framework
would only complexify them without substantial improvement.
16Moreover, we could have assumed the policy implemented by the state government to
trigger utility losses to the region’s residents (i.e. Ui;r
¡
xM¢
< 0 with i = r;l). In that case,
both conditions (breaking-up and costless separation) would have been satis…ed for a larger
range of parameters.
8Making even closer references to real situations would allow for competition
between independence supporting movements. Some groups, for example, prefer
acting inside existing institutions while others do reject the main political area
and promote violence. Actions between both kinds of groups, and their degree
of complementarity / substitutability could fruitfully enter the analysis.
Last, time consistency of policy decisions taken in the mainland in answer
to regional claims could also be explored, as some movements justify their rad-
icalisation from governmental promises not kept.
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